Afghanistan -- Crunch Time

Boy, would I hate to be the chap who makes the decision on Afghanistan. Go or stay? More troops; fewer troops? Back Kharzai, shoot Kharzai (ala Diem in South Vietnam), abandon Kharzai? Very likely the decision maker will find he is damned if he does and damned if he doesn’t.
First of all we’re talking about a nasty piece of landlocked real estate. To get so much as a single cup of water or a single bullet to our troops there, we are dependent entirely on the kindness of “friends”. Like Pakistan, Turkmenistan or Tajikistan. (The latter two require an interesting over flight near Iran and Russia).
So, hoping that everyone stays friendly enough that we can get our troops back out is a small but actual consideration. We’re also dependent on the willingness of NATO to send its troops into harm’s way. This hasn’t always worked so well in the past.
We’re up against a nation of Hatfields and McCoys. For centuries the inhabitants of that prohibitively mountainous land have made a habit of shooting at anybody on the road in the valleys. Al Qaida found a home here partly because its world view isn’t all that different from that of the Afghanis over the past centuries.
The ancient Silk Road (running from Damascus to northern China) often veered north of Afghanistan to avoid the larcenous tribesmen. Alexander the Great briefly conquered the area, then he pulled back to a string of forts designed to pen the Afghani in. This was safer.
The British lost a whole army to the Afghans in the 1840s (Kabul still has buildings pock marked with bullet holes from that battle). It became a no-man’s land during the long cold war that went on between Britain and Russia in the Nineteenth Century.
The British got nominal control over Afghani foreign policy during a second war with Afghanistan in the 1870s. In 1919 a third Afghani war cost Britain all control over Afghanistan and left it, again, an independent group of tribesmen feuding with each other.
The British built enduring governments and nations in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. They had no such success in Afghanistan. In the 1980s the Russians had their go at controlling Pakistan. We supplied people like bin Laden with modern weapons, the Russians conceded defeat and, somewhat as a consequence, the Soviet Union collapsed.
The only man who ever made a serious impact on Afghanistan was Genghis Khan. He depopulated whole areas of Afghanistan—rarely in history has there ever been a man who was so whole-heartedly into mass slaughter. Nasty, but it worked.
This was a language Afghanis understood—and the whole area was well behaved for nearly a century—allowing Marco Polo to travel all the way to China! But that’s what it took to bring peace to the area. Depopulation. Nation building? Good luck.
These historical precedents are not encouraging. The British, Macedonians and Russians couldn’t cut it militarily. Can we? In those mountains? Do we have the political stomach to do it Genghis Khan’s way?
I doubt it. I rather hope not. Is this, as it was for Russia twenty years ago, another Vietnam sucking in whole units of troops?
What horror if we walk out and al Quida walks back in with a vengeful Taliban? Will any building in New York be safe? Have we tried so much and only grabbed the tail of the tiger? If we go, if we stay—the question isn’t “which will be better?” but only “which will be worse?” Find a good option if you can. Ask Alexander or the British or the Russians. Talk to the Great Khan.
How much do we want to spend? In blood and cash? I’m so glad I don’t have to make that decision. Cuss out Obama if you will—but find a solution first.