More On Jews And Arabs (7)

The Six Day War—that began with Nasser’s boasts—would end with his total humiliation. One part of the Israeli Defense Force slashed into the Sinai. They rolled all the way to the Suez Canal, shutting it down and leaving a trail of smoldering Egyptian armor behind them.
Another part of the IDF launched an attack at the hills around Jerusalem—where British born Pasha Glubb had stopped them in 1948. This time nothing held them back. For the first time since 60BC a Jewish flag flew over the ancient City of David. The entire West Bank, down to the Jordan, was in Israeli hands—something that hadn’t happened since 600BC.
A third prong of the IDF stormed up the Golan Heights, driving the Syrians before them. The gun positions that had bedeviled Galilee for so long now lay in Israel hands—something that really hadn’t happened since the days of Solomon (950BC).
For the first time since 1948, Jews could go to the Wailing Wall (stones believed to be from Solomon’s original temple) and worship. Two thousand years of Passover Prayer—“Next year, Jerusalem”—could change its tense to “THIS year … .”
There was no possible self-deception that could hide the magnitude of this disaster. Even Nasser did not try. In fact, within two and half years, he was dead—at fifty-two, as much of humiliation as anything else. The United Arab Republic, the union of Syria and Egypt, died with him.
The Suez stayed closed. (The Viet Cong went right on—and plotted a little surprise for us in the coming six months, at the next Tet Holiday.) The guns on the West Bank and the Golan were silent.
The French were angry that Israel had tried so much on her own, and succeeded. France cut Israel off from all military supplies (a detachment of Israeli sailors sneaked into a French harbor and sailed away with three gunboats that had been built for Israel but impounded during the war).
The Americans were angry, too. An American electronic intelligence vessel, the USS Liberty, had been sitting out in the Mediterranean just off Egyptian waters listening to all the excitement when Israeli planes attacked it. It was damaged and there were several casualties. Israeli claimed it was a mistake and the matter was accepted as closed.
In the fall of 1967, Arab representatives met in Khartoum to plan strategy and protest the Israeli victory. This time they did not call for an end to Israel or the return to pre-1948 borders. The borders gained by Israel in 1948 were tacitly accepted. The new Arab call was for a return to the 1948 borders.
In November the United Nation General Assembly passed Resolution 242 which demanded that Israel pull out of Golan, the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza in return for guarantees of peace. Egypt and Jordan accepted the terms of Res. 242.
Many in Israel believed that this was just a continuation of the historic Arab strategy of calling for a truce while rearming and regrouping. Negotiations went nowhere.
In 1970, Nasser died. He was replaced by his longtime confederate, Anwar Sadat, who had been his vice president and—before that—co-conspirator against British backed King Farouk.
I recall asking two Arab friends what Sadat would do. One was an upper class Egyptian, the other a former Arab guerilla fighter who had fought the French for years in Algeria. Both agreed. Sadat must first attack Israel to get his honor back—and then he will be able to negotiate some sort of deal to end the hostilities and get the canal back.
It is possible that Israel got a little over confident. While the Soviets rearmed Sadat and Syria, equipping them with a new kind of shoulder mounted anti-tank rocket (Arabs all over the world have proven they can handle anything that mounts on the shoulder very well). There were new tanks and other goodies as well.
It was now six years since the war. The UN had nattered on to no effect. The Russians used words like “aggressors” a lot. Everybody chafed at having the canal closed—so much of the world’s oil used to sail through it and now had to go around Africa. The last Americans were pulling out of Vietnam.
Jewish holidays came and went. The orthodox prayed at the Wailing Wall. Israelis got used to driving their school buses in peace. But problems were looming. For one thing, Israel now had large numbers of disaffected Arabs to deal with in the conquered territories. For another, a new kind of Arab militancy was growing.
Yasser Arafat had lost all faith in the capability of Arab nations to defeat Israel after 1967. Two years after the Six Day War he took over the Palestine Liberation Organization and began guerilla warfare against Israel. He launched it from Jordan. The Jordanians became fearful of two things.
One) that the Palestinian refugees in Jordan might try to take over the country and two) that Israeli retaliation might occur. In September of 1970 (Black September) the Jordanian Army turned on the Palestinians, specifically Yasser Arafat’s group.
Syria tried to intervene in Arafat’s behalf but the United States urged Israel to fly over Syrian troops to deter them. The Syrians withdrew from Jordan, and Arafat and his PLO moved to Lebanon—which would have lethal consequences for both Lebanon and the United States.
Another Jewish Holiday came. Yom Kippur. October, 1973. A substantial part of the Israeli army went on leave to celebrate the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. Suddenly Sadat struck. Using new Soviet equipment they built bridges over the almost undefended canal and hurtled into the Sinai.
Some Jewish tanks were mustered only to face destruction by the new Russian missiles. For a moment, it seemed as if the Egyptians were about to reverse the events of 1967. Syria also struck on the Golan with lots of new Soviet equipment. A Jordanian brigade was sent to help on the Golan—even though Jordan launched no attacks from her own soil.
Things looked bleak. But Israel had found a new arms supplier to replace France—us. President Nixon ordered American transport planes to load up on American tanks parked in Germany. (We had so many tanks in Germany that the Pentagon actually lost five thousand of them once.) We sent 500 to Israel.
The Israeli Defense Force pulled itself together. Fierce counterattacks put Israeli forces back on the Suez Canal and left an entire Egyptian army surrounded in the Sinai desert. Syrian forces were pushed back and Israel was poised to drive to Damascus. The Israelis crossed the canal and drove toward Cairo.
At the point the chagrined Soviets came to the United States. “Look,” they said, “the surrounded Egyptian army and the arsenals in Damascus hold our latest and best military secrets. If Israel gets their hands on them, they will turn them over to you. If this happens, we HAVE to go to war.” Henry Kissinger flew to the near east to stop the shooting. The Egyptian army went back home with all of its Soviet secrets.
The IDF was stopped. After Kissinger’s negotiations, the situation was pretty much “status quo ante bellum” (think American War of 1812) in terms of military success or failure. BUT, and this was so important, an Arab army had inflicted a humiliating defeat on Israel—if only for a few days.
That was enough. Anwar Sadat could now afford to go to Camp David.